Access and Communication Pricing and Club Effect

Authors

  • Amira Saidi URMOFIB El Manar University
  • Ati Abdessatar Professor, College of Business administration

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18533/ijbsr.v3i12.383

Keywords:

Pricing of communication, club effect, Tunisie telecommunications, Network economics

Abstract

Network services are specified by external positive effects direct as well as indirect. So, the utility provided by a network service depends positively on the network size, the users of such a service. In this article, we focus on the direct externality, called also club effect: the access of new users improve user’s satisfaction. Thus, new access may affect the pricing of the telecommunications operator. It has been shown, theoretically, that there is a certain relationship between the access price and the network size. Therefore, we want to study, in this paper, the impact of the evolution of network size on the user’s access rate to the fixed telephone network on one hand, and to analyze, on the other hand, the relationship between the price of connection and that of traffic carried on such a network, which is none other than the communication service, and this is in the context of Tunisian telecommunications sector.

From a simple model globally significant, we conclude that the club effect is, in short-term, low enough to affect the pricing policy of the Tunisian incumbent in monopoly position. However, users of fixed telephony of Tunisie Telecom can benefit, in long-term, of a decrease in rates both of access and traffic carried on the fixed telephony network, notably the local and the long distance calls. In contrast, international communications behaves, in long-term, as an independent variable.

References

Bonnisseau, J.M. (1992). Tarification du raccordement et développement d’un réseau. Communications et Stratégies, vol. 9, pp. 51-66.

Barale, F. (2000). Critique de la nouvelle économie des réseaux er de son principe de séparation de l’infrastructure et des services. Revue d’Economie Industrielle, n° 91, 1er trimestre, pp. 7-24

Curien, N. (1987), «L’accès et l’usage téléphoniques : modélisation conjointe et tarification optimale. Revue Economique, vol. 38, (n° 2), pp.415-458.

Curien, N., & Gensollen, M. (1987). Les théories de la demande de raccordement téléphonique . Revue Economique, vol. 38, pp. 203-202.

Curien, N., & Gensollen, M. (1989). L’ouverture des réseaux : planification ou concurrence dans les télécommunications et d’autres services publics. Annales d’Economie et de Statistiques, (n° 15/16), pp. 355-388.

Littlechild, S.C. (1975). Two part tariffs and consumption externalities. Bell Journal Economics and Management Sciences, vol. 6, pp. 661-670.

Rohlfs, J.H. (1974). A theory of independent demand for a communication services. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, vol. 5, pp.16-37.

Bancel-Charensol, L. (1996). La déréglementation des télécommunications dans les grands pays industriels. Paris : Economica.

Curien, N. (1992). Economie et management des entreprises de réseau – Economie des réseaux, réseau organisateurs, management en réseau. Paris : Economica.

Curien, N. (2000). Economie des réseaux. Paris : Repères La Découverte.

Curien, N., & Gensollen, M. (1992). Economie des télécommunications – ouverture et réglementation. Paris : Economica.

Armstrong, M., Dole, C. & Vickers, J. (1996). The access pricing problem: a synthesis. Journal of industrial economics, vol.44, pp.131-150.

Armstrong, M. (1998). Network interconnection in telecommunications. The Economic Journal, vol.108, pp.545-564.

Armstrong, M. (2002). The theory of access pricing and interconnection. Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, vol. 1, Edited by M.E. Cave et al., pp. 295-384.

Curien, N., & Gensollen, M. (1991). Externalité de réseau : son influence sur la croissance et la tarification téléphoniques. Mélanges Economiques, Volume en l’honneur d’E. Malinvaud, Paris : Economica, pp. 237-266.

Downloads

Issue

Section

Article